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Abstract
Since the inequality of earnings in East Germany has approached
West German levels in the late 1990s, the standard Roy model pre-
dicts that a positive selection bias of East-West migrants should dis-
appear. Using a switching regression model and data from the IAB-
employment sample, we ﬁnd however that employed East-West mi-
grants remain positively self-selected with respect to unobserved abil-
ities. This result is consistent with the predictions of our extended
Roy model which considers moving costs that are negatively corre-
lated with labour market abilities of individuals. Moreover, we ﬁnd
that wage diﬀerentials as well as diﬀerences in employment oppor-
tunities are the central forces which drive East-West migration after
uniﬁcation.
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11 Introduction
Cumulative net migration from East to West Germany amounts to 1.3 mil-
lion persons or 7.5 per cent of the original population in East Germany over
the period from 1989 until the end of 2001. With that number, East Ger-
many shows together with Albania the highest emigration rate among the
countries formerly behind the iron curtain. Although net emigration rates
in East Germany declined sharply after the currency union was announced,
East-West migration has tended to increase again since 1996. The persistent
phenomenon of East-West migration has raised increasing concerns that in-
dividuals with high abilities and qualiﬁcations migrate to the West and that
this “brain drain” will contribute further to sluggish economic growth and
diverging per capita income levels.
Indeed, for an understanding of the economic consequences of migration
an analysis of the forces which drive the composition of the migrant pop-
ulation is crucial. The impact of migration on wages and employment op-
portunities of natives as well as the labour market performance and welfare
dependency of the migrants themselves is determined by the structure of the
migrant population with respect to their abilities and human capital charac-
teristics. Thus, the self-selection of migrants has important consequences for
economic growth, labour markets and the ﬁscal balance of the welfare state.
The self-selection of migrants has attracted increasing attention in the
migration literature since the seminal paper of Borjas (1987), who applied
the Roy (1951) model to the migration decision. In the Roy model, the self-
selection of individuals depends essentially on the relative returns to their
abilities, such that the distribution of income in the home and the host
region determines the composition of migrants. As a result, migrants were
positively selected at the inequality in the distribution of income is higher
in the host region than in the home region – and vice versa (Borjas, 1987,
pp. 551-52). Thus, the standard Roy model predicts that migrants from the
East were positively selected at the beginning of the transition process, since
the distribution of earnings was more equal in East Germany than in West
















































94 95 96 97
Year
East Germany West Germany
Figure 1: Wage Inequality in East and West Germany
have disappeared over time, as the inequality of earnings in East Germany
has meanwhile almost approached West German levels (see Figure 1).
The strong results from the standard Roy model are, however, controver-
sial, especially because the empirical evidence provided for its predictions is
not conclusive. Borjas (1987) analyses the the development of earnings of
migrants in the host region, which allows no direct inference on the ques-
tion of whether migrants are drawn from the upper or the lower tail of the
income distribution in their home countries. Moreover, Borjas’ (1987) con-
clusion that the “quality” of US migrants has declined over time has been
questioned (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990). Thus, many authors argue that
migrants are presumably favourably selected although the variance of earn-
ings is higher in the home region relative to the host region.
An empirical analysis of selection bias in the context of international
migration is seriously hampered by a lack of individual data. Household
panels in the home countries usually do not allow international emigrants to
be identiﬁed - they simply disappear from the panel. Thus, although we have
rich information on immigrants in many host countries, the phenomenon of
self-selection cannot be addressed systematically on the basis of standard
data sources.
German uniﬁcation oﬀers a unique opportunity to study the problem of
the selection of migrants. There exist several micro data sets that allow East-
West migrants to be identiﬁed before and after movement. We employ the
3“IAB-Regionalstichprobe”, which is a one per cent sample of individuals who
are registered by the German social security system and includes individuals
in both parts of Germany. This data set enables us to analyse whether and
to what extent relative returns to abilities aﬀect the self-sorting of East-
West migrants. The empirical framework is based on a switching regression
model (Goldfeld and Quandt, 1973) with endogenous switching (Maddala
and Nelson, 1975; Maddala, 1983). The switching regression model can be
derived from the Roy model and was ﬁrst applied in the context of migration
decisions by Nakosteen and Zimmer (1984). It makes it possible not only to
estimate the wage diﬀerential for (prospective) migrants consistently, but also
enables us to draw inferences on the selection bias of the migrant population.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: ﬁrstly, we brieﬂy
review the ﬁndings of the empirical literature on East-West migration in
Germany (Section 2). Secondly, we present an extended version of Roy’s
model which considers the correlation between moving costs and abilities of
individuals in the labour market. As a result, the strong predictions of Roy’s
model are relaxed or even reversed (Section 3). Thirdly, we describe the data
base (Section 4) and analyse the socio-economic characteristics of migrants
(Section 5). Fourthly, we present the switching regression model and discuss
the econometric results (Section 6). In conclusion we summarise our ﬁndings
and their implications for the theory and empiry of self-selection (Section 7).
2 Empirical literature
There exists a large body of literature on East-West migration in Germany
that addresses the problem of self-selection at least partially. At ﬁrst glance,
this literature seems to conﬁrm the hypothesis that “those who emigrate
tend to be better educated and possibly better workers in unobservable ways
than stayers” (Burda and Hunt, 2001, p. 65). In her comprehensive analy-
sis of German East-West migration, Hunt (2000) ﬁnds, based on individual
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), that migrants are
disproportionately high skilled if controlling for age and gender. However,
they are disproportionately low skilled if those control variables are not in-
4cluded. Hunt interprets this as evidence that, in particular, the young and
high-skilled tend to move. Based on an analysis of migration intentions as
revealed in the GSOEP, Burda (1993) shows that those having completed
secondary schooling with an Abitur (academic secondary schooling exam)
intend to move over proportionally, while those with a university or other
tertiary education degree intend to move less frequently than other educa-
tion groups (Burda, 1993, p. 460). Similar results can be found in Burda,
H¨ ardle, M¨ uller, and Werwatz (1998). In contrast, the results of Schwarze
(1996) indicate that years of education are positively correlated with migra-
tion intentions as well as with actual migration. Analogously, Pischke, Staat,
and V¨ ogele (1994) show on basis of data from the “Arbeitsmarktmonitor”
that East-West commuters possess higher skill levels than stayers.
Moreover, the results in the empirical literature regarding the impact of
the wage diﬀerential on the propensity to migrate are ambiguous. While
Schwarze (1996) ﬁnds that the wage diﬀerential aﬀects individual migration
probabilities positively, the results of Hunt (2000) and Burda, H¨ ardle, M¨ uller,
and Werwatz (1998) indicate that no unambiguous correlation between the
wage diﬀerential and the propensity to migrate exists. Burda, H¨ ardle, M¨ uller,
and Werwatz (1998) interpret the non-linear relation between the income
diﬀerential and migration probabilities in their estimates as evidence for the
option value of waiting theory of migration. However, to the best of our
knowledge, no paper on the determinants of East-West migration considers
the self-selection of migrants. Thus, the results might be aﬀected by selection
bias.
Altogether, the results of the empirical literature regarding the question
whether migrants from East Germany are positively selected are not conclu-
sive. Furthermore, the empirical literature on the determinants of East-West
migration does not consider the selection of migrants with regard to unob-
servable abilities in the labour market, which may bias their results.
53 Theoretical framework
The self-selection of migrants is aﬀected by various factors since both the
beneﬁts as well as the costs of migration are not equally distributed across
the population. The Roy model oﬀers a rigorous and theoretically powerful
framework to analyse the self-selection of individuals. According to the Roy
model, self-selection is driven by comparative advantage of individuals. As
a consequence, the distribution of income in the host and the home region
determines whether individuals with higher or lower abilities tend to migrate:
if the distribution of income in the host region is more equal than in the home
region, and if the correlation between the incomes of (potential) migrants in
both locations is positive, migrants are chosen from the lower tail of the
income distribution and vice versa (Borjas, 1987, pp. 551-52).
In its original formulation, the Roy model does not consider any switching
costs. In the context of migration, pecuniary and non-pecuniary moving costs
are, however, an important factor which cannot be ignored in the analysis
of the migration decision. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that abilities
relevant for the labour market performance of individuals and moving costs
are negatively correlated, i.e. that the same human capital characteristics
which yield higher returns in the labour market allow individuals to better
reduce moving costs. In this more general framework, migrants may be cho-
sen from the upper tail of the income distribution although the distribution
of income in the host region is more equal than in the home region.1
In what follows, we discuss ﬁrst the mechanics of an extended Roy model
which considers the correlation between labour market abilities and moving
costs in order to derive the framework for the empirical analysis and then
present the estimation model.
1A similar point has recently been made by Chiswick (2000): He demonstrates in a
numerical example that the strong implications of the Roy model are relaxed if ﬁxed
moving costs are considered.
63.1 An extension of the Roy model
Suppose that w1 is the wage of residents in the home region (region 1), and
w2 the wage of residents in the host region (region 2). Assume that log wages
in region 1 and region 2 have a joint normal distribution, such that
lnw1 = ¹1 + "1; (1)
where ¹1 is the mean of the log wage in region 1 and "1 a normally distributed
disturbance with zero mean and variance ¾2
1. Analogously,
lnw2 = ¹2 + "2; (2)
where "2 is normally distributed with zero mean and variance ¾2
2. The Roy
model focuses on the impact of selection bias on the disturbances "1 and "2,
which can be interpreted as (unobservable) abilities of individuals.
The original Roy model ignores all switching costs, i.e. an individual
from region 1 migrates into region 2 if w2 > w1. However, it is reasonable to
assume that moving costs exist and that they are related to human capital
characteristics and other abilities of individuals. Suppose that C represents
the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of migration as a proportion of home
income. Migration occurs if
w2¡w1
w1 > C, or, approximately, if lnw2 ¡lnw1 >
C. Assume that C is normally distributed with mean ¿ and disturbance ´,
i.e.
C = ¿ + ´; (3)
and that ´ » N(0;¾2
´). The decision to migrate is then determined by the
sign of the index function, I¤, which contains the wage gain from moving
minus the costs of migration:
I
¤ = ¹2 ¡ ¹1 ¡ ¿ + "2 ¡ "1 ¡ ´; (4)





Var("2 ¡ "1 ¡ ´); z = ¡
¹2 ¡ ¹1 ¡ ¿
¾¤ ; and ² =
"2 ¡ "1 ¡ ´
¾¤ :
Migration occurs if ² > z. Under the normality assumptions, the migra-
tion rate m is given by
m = Pr(² > z) = 1 ¡ Φ(z); (5)
where Φ() is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.
Using the standard sample selection formula (Heckman, 1976, 1979), the
(unobserved) wage of a migrant in the home region can be written as
E(lnw1jI
¤ > 0) = ¹1 + ¾1²¸(z); (6)
and the observed wage in the host region as
E(lnw2jI
¤ > 0) = ¹2 + ¾2²¸(z); (7)
where ¾1² and ¾2² are the covariance of "1 and ², and the covariance of "2




is the inverse of Mills’ ratio and Á() the density of the standard normal.
Whether migrants are better or worse oﬀ than the average person in the
home and the host region depends on the sign of the second term in the
equations (6) and (7). Since ¸(z) ¸ 0 by deﬁnition, the average migrant
is better oﬀ than the average person in the home region if ¾1² > 0, and,
analogously, better oﬀ than the average person in the host region if ¾2² > 0
– if we ignore the limiting case that ¸(z) = 0.
An interpretation of these conditions requires that we decompose ¾1² and








2 ¡ ¾12 ¡ ¾2´
¾¤ :
Thus, we can derive two fundamental conditions for the favourable self-
selection of migrants: ﬁrstly, migrants are better oﬀ than the average person
in the home population if ¾12 > ¾2












where ½12 is the correlation coeﬃcient between "1 and "2, and ½1´ the corre-
lation coeﬃcient between "1 and ´. We assume for the further analysis that
½12 > 0, since a negative correlation between earnings in both regions makes
no sense economically. Note that the second term on the right-hand side
captures the correlation between labour-market abilities and moving costs.
Since we assume that labour-market abilities and moving costs are nega-
tively correlated, i.e. that ½1´ < 0, the second term is negative, and, hence,
increases the probability of a favourable selection of migrants relative to the
average person in the home population for a given variance of earnings in the
host and the home region.
Secondly, the migrant is better oﬀ than the average person in the host
region if ¾2
2 > ¾12 + ¾2´ , or if
¾2
¾1




where ½2´ is the correlation coeﬃcient between "2 and ´. Once again, since
we assume that ½2´ < 0, the second term on the right-hand side increases
the probability of a favourable selection of migrants relative to the average
person in the host population for a given variance of earnings in the host and
the home region.
3.2 Comparative Statics
Consider now the implications of the model for a change in the economic con-
ditions underlying the (self-)selection of migrants. We can write the selection
9bias of migrants relative to the average person in the home population as
Sj = Sj (!;C;¾1;¾2;´;½12;½1´;½2´); j 2 f1;2g
where ! ´ ¹2 ¡ ¹1 is the income diﬀerence between the host and the home
region. The second terms in equations (6) and (7) show that the selection
bias in the home region is given by
S1 = ¾1²¸(z);
and in the host region by
S2 = ¾2²¸(z):
We can thus write the impact of a change in any variable x on the change in




















The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side in equations (10) and (11) captures the
composition eﬀect for a constant scale of migration, and the second term the
scale eﬀect for a given composition of the migrant population (Borjas, 1987).
We focus here on the selection bias of migrants relative to the average








¾1, i.e. if migrants are positively selected, and a negative
one, if otherwise.
Consider ﬁrst the impact of a change in the diﬀerence of earnings between









i.e. a change in the income diﬀerential aﬀects the composition of migrants
only via the scale eﬀect. An increase in the diﬀerence of earnings between
the host and the home region reduces the positive (negative) selection bias
10of the migrant population if they are positively (negatively) selected. The
intuition behind this result is that a higher diﬀerence in earnings increases
the share of migrants in the population, which in turn reduces the selection
bias in both directions, since migrants are increasingly drawn from the mean
parts of the income distribution.









since increasing moving costs reduces the share of migrants in the population,
which in turn increases the selection bias of the migrant population.
The impact of a change in the inequality of earnings on the selection bias











where the sign of the ﬁrst term – the composition eﬀect – is positive if
2¾1 (¾1 ¡ ½12¾2 + ½1´¾´)
2 > (2¾1 ¡ ½12¾2 + ½1´¾´)¾¤2, which depends on the
value of the parameters. The impact of the second term – the scale eﬀect
– depends on the sign of z. If the net diﬀerence in mean earnings (incl.
moving costs) is positive (i.e. z < 0), the scale eﬀect is negative, and positive
if otherwise. Intuitively, with a higher inequality of earnings in the home
region, the incentives to migrate for those who are better oﬀ decline, while
those at the lower tail of the income distribution still want to migrate, such
that the migrant population becomes increasingly negatively selected with
an increasing inequality of income in the home region.
The eﬀect of an increasing inequality of earnings in the host region is again





¾1 (½12 ¾¤2 ¡ k n)






where n is deﬁned as ¾2 + ½12¾1 ¡ ½23¾´ > 0. The composition eﬀect has a
positive sign if ½12¾¤2 > kn, which is always the case if a negative selection
11bias of the migrant population exists. In the converse case, the sign of the
composition eﬀect depends on the sign of the individual parameters. The
scale eﬀect is positive if migrants are positively selected and the net diﬀerence
in earnings between the host and the home region is positive (i.e. z < 0), and
negative in the converse case. Thus, an increase in the inequality of earnings
in the host region strengthens a given selection bias in both directions via
the scale eﬀect if the diﬀerence in net earnings is positive, while it reduces
a negative selection bias via the composition eﬀect, and is ambiguous if a
positive selection bias exists.
Finally, we can assess the implications of a change in the correlation
coeﬃcients. The derivation of the change in S1 with respect to a change in




































In all three equations, the composition eﬀect and the scale eﬀect have the
same sign if the net diﬀerence in mean earnings (incl. moving costs) between
the host and the home is positive (z < 0), and the converse sign if the net
diﬀerence in mean earnings is negative (z > 0). Thus, an increasing (positive)
correlation between earnings in the home and the host region strengthens
the selection bias both via the composition eﬀect and the scale eﬀect if the
net diﬀerence in earnings is positive. In contrast, an increasing (negative)
correlation between labour market abilities and moving costs weakens the
selection bias if the net diﬀerence in earnings is positive.
To sum up, the mechanics of the enhanced Roy model demonstrates that
(i) a higher variance of earnings in the home region relative to the host region
does not necessarily yield a negative selection bias of the migrant population,
(ii) a positive selection bias is more likely to occur if we consider the cor-
12relation between labour market abilities and moving costs, (iii) increasing
the diﬀerence in net earnings between the home and the host region reduces
the selection bias of the migrant population, (iv) increasing the (positive)
correlation between earnings in both regions strengthens the selection bias,
and (v) increasing the (negative) correlation between earnings and moving
costs weakens the selection bias. Increasing the inequality of earnings in the
home as well in the host region has an ambiguous eﬀect on the selection bias.
The scale eﬀect weakens the selection bias if the inequality of home earnings
increases and if the net diﬀerence in earnings is positive, and strengthens the
selection bias if the inequality of host earnings increases. The sign of the
composition eﬀect depends on the value of the parameters of the model.
Thus, in the case of East-West migration in Germany, diﬀerent forces
may have aﬀected the selection bias of the migrant population in diﬀerent
directions: ﬁrst, the increasing inequality of earnings in the East may have
reduced the incentives to migrate for those at the upper tail of the income
distribution via the scale eﬀect, and, hence, may have reduced the positive
selection bias. Second, the convergence of wages between East and West Ger-
many may have resulted in less migration, and, hence, increased the positive
selection bias. Third, reduced moving costs may have increased migration
and thus reduced the positive selection bias. Altogether, the increasing in-
equality of earnings in East Germany does not necessarily negatively aﬀect
the selection of migrants with regard to their abilities.
3.3 Estimation
The Roy model as described above can be considered a switching regression
model (Goldfeld and Quandt, 1973) with endogenous switching (Maddala
and Nelson, 1975; Maddala, 1983).
Rewrite the wage equations in (1) and (2) as
lnw1i = X1i¯1 + "1i; (19)
and
lnw2i = X2i¯2 + "2i; (20)
13where Xi is a vector of personal variables which is observed for each individual
i. In the empirical application, we also consider regional and sectoral control
variables. Suppose that the index function for the ith individual is given by
I
¤
i = ±(lnw2i ¡ lnw1i) ¡ Zi° ¡ ´i; (21)
where ± denotes a coeﬃcient, Zi° + ´i = Ci the migration cost, and Zi
again a vector of regional and personal variables. Note that the coeﬃcient
± implies that migration is a log-linear function of the income diﬀerence, i.e.
the functional form which we employ here for estimation diﬀers slightly from
the theoretical model. Identiﬁcation of the model requires that at least one
variable in Zi is not included in the vector Xi.
It is obvious from the discussion of the Roy model that the index func-
tion cannot be estimated in structural form since the term lnw2i ¡ lnw1i is
endogenous. Following Lee (1978) and Willis and Rosen (1979) the model
can be estimated in three steps. In the ﬁrst step we estimate a reduced form











i , °¤ and ²¤ are deﬁned suitably. Deﬁne Ii = 1 if I¤ > 0 and
Ii = 0 otherwise. Based on the observations on Ii we can then use the
probit Maximum Likelihood estimator in the ﬁrst step to obtain a consistent
estimate for the vector b °¤.
Wages in region 1 can be observed only for those individuals for whom
Ii = 0, and wages in region 2 only for those individuals for whom Ii = 1.
Estimating the wage equations therefore requires correction for this selec-
tion bias. Using the estimated vector of parameters b °¤, we can compute








i b °¤), re-
spectively. Under the normality assumptions, this allows us to correct for
selection bias and to estimate in the second step the wage equations for
14stayers in the home region and movers to the host region by OLS:





+ u1i; for Ii = 0; (23)
and





+ u2i; for Ii = 1; (24)
which gives us consistent estimates of ¯1, ¯2, ¾1²¤, and ¾2²¤. Furthermore,
it is possible to derive consistent estimates for ¾2
1 and ¾2
2 from the residuals
of the wage equations and estimated parameters (see Maddala, 1983, pp.
225-26). In our empirical application, we estimated the reduced form probit
model and each of the two Heckman selection equations in one step using
a maximum likelihood estimator (Greene, 1997). The ML function uses the
estimated parameters from the reduced form probit model as starting values
for the estimation of the Heckman corrected wage equations.
In the ﬁnal step, we again use the probit model to estimate the structural
equation and to obtain a consistent estimate of ±, the coeﬃcient of the wage
diﬀerential. Substituting ln b w1i = X1ib ¯1 and ln b w2i = X2ib ¯2 for lnw1i and ln
w2i, respectively, allows us to estimate the structural probit equation. As Lee
(1979) has demonstrated, the resulting estimates of ° and ± are consistent.
4 Data
We perform our empirical analysis of the self-selection of East-West migrants
in Germany using individual data from the “IAB-Regionalstichprobe”.2 This
data set contains a one per cent sample of all the returns of the social secu-
rity ﬁles of Germany, collected by the Federal Employment Services (Bun-
desanstalt f¨ ur Arbeit). The East German sample starts at the beginning of
1992 and the last spells are reported for 1997.
The sample covers employed persons, unemployed persons and individuals
who are currently taking a break from employment. Self-employed persons
2Employee sample, regional ﬁle. The IAB-Regionalstichprobe is provided by the Ger-
man Institute for Employment Research (IAB) at the Federal Employment Services (Bun-
desanstalt f¨ ur Arbeit). See Haas (2001) for a brief introduction.
15and those who are enrolled in educational programs are not included. More-
over, the sample is censored from above, i.e. individuals whose earnings
exceed the rather high ceiling for contributions to the public pension scheme
and unemployment insurance in Germany are not reported.3 In 1995, 86.2%
of the economically active population was captured by the social security
ﬁles in East Germany (Bender, Haas, and Klose, 2000, p. 3).
The observations of each individual are organised as event data. Every
change in the employment situation is collected with the date of its event,
but also every year a control return is registered. For each individual, work
history, personal characteristics, ﬁrm characteristics and regional details are
collected. We choose only individuals who are employed full-time on 31
March. The employment state on 31 March of every year is used to transform
the event-oriented data into a panel of yearly observations.
It is not trivial to identify East Germans in the data set. For the purpose
of our analysis, we deﬁne East Germans as follows: (i) they have their ﬁrst
spell in 1992 or later, since East Germans were not included in the IAB
sample before; (ii) they are registered in an East German pension scheme4
if they are employed, and (iii) they work at a company in East Germany
if they are employed. These deﬁnitions imply that we do not include those
East Germans in our analysis who have migrated to West Germany before
1992.
On the basis of these deﬁnitions, we distinguish two groups of individ-
uals: stayers are all individuals that have been registered as employees or
unemployed in East Germany for the whole time span from 1992 to 1997 and
all individuals who are registered in East Germany, but will later move to
West Germany during the observed time period; movers are individuals who
are in a spell in the West for the ﬁrst time, i.e. those who moved during the
previous year. Since our regressions are based on a cross-sectional analysis,
we do not consider the spells of East Germans who have been residing in
West Germany for more than two years. By deﬁnition, our sample contains
3The ceiling was 5,300 DM in 1992 and 7,100 DM in 1997, while the mean incomes in
our sample amount to 2,695 and 3,097 for the two years.
4Landesversicherungsanstalt (LVA) Ost, Bundesversicherungsanstalt f¨ ur Angestellte
(BfA) Ost, or Knappschaft.
16Table 1: Number of observations
year movers stayers perc. of movers
1994 428 33038 1.30
1995 380 33677 1.13
1996 389 32418 1.20
1997 364 30878 1.18
observations for stayers over the whole period from 1992 to 1997, for movers
only from 1993 to 1997.
Table 1 shows that the number of individuals in our sample is slightly
declining. Some of the individuals may vanish from the sample due to death,
international migration, leaving the labour force or becoming unemployed.
Moreover, those who reside in West Germany for at least the second year van-
ish from the sample. Numerically, the highest number of movers is achieved
in 1994. In relative numbers, the share of movers diminishes only slightly
from 1.3% in 1994 to 1.2% in 1997.
5 Characteristics of East-West migrants
The following graphs provide some initial insights into the socio-economic
characteristics of East-West migrants. Summary statistics for all the vari-
ables used in our regressions for the individual years can be found in Table
11.
Figure 2 displays the development of the mean log of wages per day in
DM, divided into three groups: stayers and movers as deﬁned above, and
a third category, called prospective movers. The last category contains all
individuals who are still in East Germany, but will move during the observa-
tion period. We include this third group here because the diﬀerence between
prospective movers and stayers is striking: wages of prospective movers start
well below those of stayers, although they receive much the same wage in-
crease as stayers. Note that the lower wage level may reﬂect the diﬀerence in
the age of stayers and migrants (see below). However, movers already work-

































Figure 2: Mean wage
The descriptive statistics of the education variables seem to indicate that
East-West migrants are slightly less skilled than the average person in East
Germany. We distinguish three groups by their highest education degree:
those who possess no vocational education degree, those who possess a voca-
tional education degree, and those who possess a degree from a university or
a university of applied sciences.5 Figure 3 displays the share of individuals
without vocational education degree in the groups of movers and stayers. The
share of unskilled is, at around seven per cent, relatively low in the group of
stayers, and shows a very strong decline in the group of movers (from around
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Figure 3: Mean of no vocational training degree
5A fourth group, unknown or missing education, is used in the regressions, but we do
not display it here.
18Figure 4 shows the individuals with completed vocational training, which
is the most common education group in East Germany. The share of indi-
viduals with completed vocational training is persistently high at around 74
per cent among the group of stayers, while the share in the group of movers
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Figure 4: Mean of vocational training degree
Finally, we observe that the share of individuals with an academic edu-
cation degree is lower in the group of movers than in the group of stayers.
Note that, at around 11 per cent, the share of individuals with an academic
degree is relatively low in the East German population. While the share of
individuals with an academic degree is stable among the group of stayers,
we observe that it is increasing from 1995 onward (Figure 5). It is moreover
worth noting that our sample covers only individuals who have already par-
ticipated in the East German labour market, i.e. students and those with
an academic degree who take up their ﬁrst job in West Germany are not
considered here. Moreover, individuals with a wage above the ceiling of the
social security records are not covered. These exclusions can heavily bias the
results with regard to high-skilled jobs.
To summarise, we observe that employed migrants are less skilled than
the sample average.
The diﬀerence in lagged unemployment rates of movers and stayers is
relatively stable with a diﬀerence of 10 to 15 percentage points, i.e. unem-
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Figure 5: Mean of academic degree
lagged unemployment rate is underreported in our sample, since we excluded
those who are unemployed in the present year. Thus, long-term unemployed
are not covered by our sample.
Over the whole time span, the mean age of movers is, at round 34 years,
persistently ﬁve years below the mean age of stayers (39 years). The age
increase is less than proportional, because young people are allowed to enter
the sample after 1992 if they start working in East Germany. Altogether, the
descriptive statistics conﬁrm the hypothesis of the human capital theories of
migration that young people have a higher propensity to move.
The other personal characteristics show the following pattern (not dis-
played here): at the sample mean, the share of males among movers varies
between 62 and 71 per cent, while the share of males among the stayers is
constant at around 57 per cent. Moreover, there is a persistent diﬀerence in
the marital status of migrants and stayers: while around 57 per cent of the
stayers are married, only around 40 per cent of the movers are. Once again,
these results conﬁrm a standard hypothesis from the human capital theory
of migration, i.e. that family ties aﬀect the costs of migration.
6 Regression results
As has been outlined above, the estimation of the switching regression model
consists of three steps: ﬁrstly, we estimate a reduced form probit model in
20order to obtain a consistent estimate of the individual probability to move.
The results from this estimate are used as starting values for a maximum-
likelihood estimation of a Heckit selection model of the wage equations for
East Germans in West and East Germany. In the ﬁnal step, consistent es-
timates of the parameters in the wage equations are used for estimating a
structural probit model which includes the estimated potential wage diﬀer-
ential for each individual.
The explanatory variables are derived from the human capital theories of
migration (Sjaastad, 1961): Beyond the (expected) diﬀerential in wages it is
assumed that personal characteristics such as age, family ties and education
aﬀect the costs and returns to migration, and, hence, the decision to migrate.
Moreover, following the traditional approach of Harris and Todaro (1970),
we assume that employment opportunities aﬀect expected earnings.
The wage regressions have the traditional Mincer form, i.e. log wages
are explained by human capital variables such as education, age brackets,
gender, and by occupational status. We do not include marital status in
the wage regressions, since this variable is one of those used to identify the
model. This is possible because family status turned out not to be signiﬁcant
in determining gross wages and should also not be correlated with the error
term of the wage regression.
Furthermore, branch dummies are included. In order to account for re-
gional and branch diﬀerences in economic prospects, we also include dummies
for the East German Federal States (Bundesl¨ ander) and branches. We do
not include the West German Bundesl¨ ander because we can not construct a
counterfactual for stayers, had they moved. The counterfactual Bundesland
of movers, had they stayed, is their Bundesland of origin.
Thus, in the wage regressions for East Germany, dummies for the home
region (Bundesland), dummies for the home industry branch and the lagged
unemployment rate are included. In the decision equation, we include the
lags of most variables in order to account for the fact that the decision to
migrate was made the year before, which implies that expectations have been
formed on basis of the explanatory variables of the past year.
216.1 Results from the Heckit regressions
We estimate four cross-sections for the years 1994 - 1997. The results of the
Heckman selection (’Heckit’) estimates are reported in Tables 3 to 6. The
coeﬃcients of ¸ as reported in the tables are the covariances ¾1²¤ and ¾2²¤, as
deﬁned in the wage regressions for stayers and movers (Equations 6 and 7).
Note that ¾1²¤ = ½1²¤¾1 and that ¾2²¤ = ½2²¤¾2, where ½1²¤ and ½2²¤ are the
correlation coeﬃcients between the disturbances of the probit and the wage
equations. The values of these coeﬃcients are also reported in Tables 3 to 6.
The signs of the estimated coeﬃcients for ½1²¤ and ½2²¤ determine whether
the unobserved abilities of individuals are positively or negatively correlated
with the wage levels. We ﬁnd in all four cross-sections that the sign of the
correlation coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant for stayers, and positive
and signiﬁcant for movers. Thus, this can be interpreted as strong evidence
that East-West migrants tend to be positively selected with respect to their
unobserved abilities. Although the positive selection bias varies somewhat in
the diﬀerent cross-sections, we do not observe that the positive selection bias
disappears over time. Thus, the increasing inequality of earnings in Eastern
Germany do not seem to have aﬀected the selection bias in our regressions.
The wage diﬀerential is calculated on the consistent estimate of wages
which are not biased by a selection eﬀect (see Figure 6). If we take into
account the selection eﬀect, the wage diﬀerential is much higher (see Figure
8). Note that this wage diﬀerential cannot be included in the probit regression
directly because of the huge diﬀerence among stayers and movers which would
produce a perfect prediction on who moves and who stays.
The education variables show the expected signs and have a stable eﬀect
on wages in East Germany over time. The wage premium for individuals with
completed training over individuals without completed training amounts to
13 to 15 per cent. Individuals with a university degree get a wage premium
of 37 to 42 per cent. The wage gap between no education and university
education amounts, then, to about 40 DM per day. Unknown education
also gets a wage premium over no education, but the premium is decreasing
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Figure 8: Mean of the wage diﬀerential calculated taking into account the
sample selection
23education is not rewarded diﬀerently than no training. The wage premium
for university education is similar to East Germany with a higher volatility
of between 33 to 61 per cent. Also the premium of training is similar to East
Germany, but the trends of the curves are less smooth, possibly due to the
smaller sample size in West Germany.
Workers with completed vocational training receive four to seven per cent
higher wages than workers without completed training in East Germany, and
white collar workers and foremen receive the highest wages (between 30 and
40 per cent more than workers without vocational training). In West Ger-
many, we observe that only clerks and foremen earn signiﬁcantly more than
the other two groups. Skilled workers get signiﬁcantly more than unskilled
only in the years 1996 and 1997. The insigniﬁcant diﬀerence between skilled
and unskilled workers might be interpreted as evidence for a devaluation of
work-speciﬁc human capital.
With regard to the age eﬀect on wages, there is again a diﬀerence between
movers and stayers. Stayers get a shrinking wage increase while moving
through the age brackets. This is consistent with the normal ﬁndings in wage
regressions where the coeﬃcients for age are positive and the coeﬃcients for
age squared are negative. From the age bracket 41-50 or latest from the age
bracket 51-64 onwards, the wage even decreases. For movers, the picture
is less smooth. The standard result of decreasing returns to age is also
observable, but there exists a dip in all the observed years with individuals
in their thirties getting lower wages than younger movers. Movers also get a
less steep wage increase than stayers, which can be explained by the missing
tenure of movers.
Men get consistently higher wages than women over time in East and
West Germany.
6.2 Results from the probit estimates
The results of the reduced form probit regressions are reported in Tables 7 and
8, and of the structural form probit regressions in Tables 9 and 10. We show
only the results for the probability to move. The results for the probability
24to stay can be derived from the results shown by just switching the sign
of the coeﬃcients. In the ﬁrst step (reduced form probit), one can observe
the overall eﬀect of the explanatory variables. The eﬀect is composed of the
direct eﬀect and the indirect eﬀect which goes through the wage diﬀerential.
In the second step (the structural probit), only the exogenous variables are
included. The variables which are expected to aﬀect wages are excluded
because of collinearity between these variables and the wage diﬀerential.
The probit regressions explain the probability of an individual to work
in West Germany in year t instead of staying in East Germany and working
there. The explanatory variables refer to year t ¡ 1, i.e. they measure
the status of a migrant or a stayer in East Germany the year before the
observation. We included once again only individuals who are employed in
year t. All regressions include a large number of individuals, of whom only
very few decide to migrate (see Table 1).
In the reduced form probit equation we observe some surprising results.
Regarding the education variables, we do not ﬁnd a clear picture like those
found in other studies. None of our education variables turn out to be sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero over time. Only two of the parameters are
signiﬁcant at the ten percent level, but they do not bring any insights re-
garding the eﬀects of education on the decision to migrate over time. We
conclude, therefore, that the education level does not aﬀect the migration
decision of workers directly.
Regarding the occupational status, skilled workers tend to move less than
unskilled workers with signiﬁcantly negative parameters from 1994 to 1996.
Also clerks and foremen are potentially less likely to move than workers with
no vocational training with only one signiﬁcantly negative parameter in 1996.
The lagged unemployment rate exerts a very important impact on the
migration decision. We expected the eﬀect of unemployment to be large
because we already observed in the descriptive analysis a huge diﬀerence in
the lagged unemployment rates of movers and stayers (see Section 5).
Among the personal characteristics, the marital status variable has the
expected signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on migration in almost all cross sections
(except 1995). The age brackets show a clear picture during the whole time
25period. The cohorts with an age between 21 and 25 are most likely to move.
The oldest age group in the sample, i.e. the cohorts with an age from 51 to
64 years, have the highest propensity to stay in East Germany. All other age
groups behave like the reference category aged 17 to 21.
The other personal and family variables also show the expected results.
Males are signiﬁcantly more likely to move, while married individuals are less
likely to move. The children dummy is not signiﬁcant, perhaps due to the
fact that children are underreported in the social security records.6 Sector
and regional dummies do not show a clear pattern over time. Saxony is
the only exception which shows a signiﬁcant attraction preventing workers
from moving to West Germany from 1995 onward. Mecklenburg-Western
Pomerania shows a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect in the structural probit only in
1994.
The wage diﬀerential has the expected positive sign in all four cross-
sections in the structural form probit estimates. The estimated eﬀect of the
wage diﬀerential has to be interpreted as the minimum eﬀect of the wage
diﬀerential, because we used the linear predictions not taking into account
the selection eﬀect. If we consider the selection eﬀect, the impact of the wage
diﬀerential would be much higher (see Graph 6).
The second important explanation for the decision to move is lagged
unemployment in the structural form probit estimates. This replicates the
results from the reduced form probit. It has a positive and highly signiﬁ-
cant impact on the probability to move. Marital status now has signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀects in all years, while the dummy for children is still not signiﬁ-
cant. The results for the home regions are also similar to the reduced form.
Thus, the economic variables in the structural probit regressions do have the
expected signs and are signiﬁcant.
6The main reason for underreporting is that only one parent receives welfare beneﬁts
from children (like Kindergeld, Kinderfreibetrag), such that the other parent appears as
childless in the social security records.
26Table 2: Employment and unemployment among stayers and movers
Stayers Movers
year employed unemployed percent employed unemployed percent
1994 33038 4574 13.8 428 51 11.9
1995 33677 4638 13.8 380 44 11.6
1996 32418 6502 20.1 389 82 21.1
1997 30878 6602 21.4 364 88 24.2
6.3 Comparision of Probit estimates with and without
unemployed
We have excluded the unemployed from our regressions, which may bias the
results if the unemployment rates in the group of movers and stayers and
their socio-economic characteristics diﬀer. Table 2 displays the number of
employed and unemployed in the groups of movers and stayers. The ﬁgures
show very similar unemployment rates in both groups. The diﬀerence in the
characteristics are not displayed here. However, including the unemployed
in the probit regressions does not change the results much: the parameters
have a similar size and we observe the same pattern of signiﬁcance.7 Thus,
we can conclude that the exclusion of the unemployed has not aﬀected our
results.
7 Conclusion
East Germany inherited from central planning greater equality in the dis-
tribution of earnings, but the inequality in earnings has almost approached
West German levels in less than ten years since the beginning of transition.
The standard Roy model predicts that migrants are favourably selected if
the variance of earnings is higher in the host region than in the home region
and if the correlation between earnings in both regions is suﬃciently strong.
Thus, we can derive from the Roy model the hypothesis that migrants from
East Germany should have been favourably selected in the beginning, but
7The results are available from the authors upon request.
27that the selection bias should have disappeared over time.
Our ﬁndings do not conﬁrm this hypothesis. We analysed the self-
selection of East-West migrants in Germany on basis of a switching regres-
sion model. The results from our selection regressions provide strong evi-
dence that migrants from East Germany are positively selected with regard
to unobserved abilities. Thus, migrants tend to earn more than their staying
counterparts if we control for observable human capital characteristics. East-
West migrants do, however, remain positively selected over time although the
inequality in the distribution in East Germany has substantially increased.
This result clearly contradicts the predictions of the standard Roy model.
However, if we relax the assumptions of the standard model and consider
moving costs which are negatively correlated with abilities relevant for the
labour market performance of individuals, then a persistent positive selection
bias is in line with the theoretical expectations resulting from an extended
Roy model. Nevertheless, our results should be interpreted with caution,
since our sample covers only ﬁve years.
In contrast to studies based on other data sources, we do not ﬁnd that
individuals with higher education degrees tend to have a higher propensity to
migrate. Conversely, the descriptive statistics in our data set show that skill
levels of the migrants are below those of the average person who remains
in East Germany. Moreover, we do not ﬁnd in our reduced form probit
regressions any signiﬁcant impact of education on the propensity to migrate.
This holds true for the whole time period covered by our sample. However,
these results can be traced back at least partly to the fact that an important
group of high-skilled migrants, students and individuals with an academic
degree who started their working career in West Germany, is not included in
our sample.
Interestingly enough, we ﬁnd a negative correlation between occupational
status and migration probabilities in our reduced form probit regressions. We
interpret this as an indication that occupational status is at least partly lost
by moving from the East to the West, i.e. that migrants are only partly
able to transfer their work experience and ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital to the
West.
28The wage diﬀerential shows a strong positive impact on the propensity
to migrate in our structural probit estimates. Moreover, an unemployment
event in the period preceding migration turns out to be highly signiﬁcant.
These ﬁndings are in contrast to parts of the empirical literature based on
individual data sets which do not control for selection bias of migrants. Thus,
the results from our switching regression estimates reconcile some of the
paradoxical ﬁndings in the empirical literature on the impact of wages and
other key economic variables on East-West migration in Germany.
Finally, the results from our probit regressions conﬁrm some standard
ﬁndings from the human capital theories of migration: the propensity to
migrate declines with age, married individuals tend to migrate less than
unmarried, and males tend to migrate more than females.
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32Table 3: Heckit East German Wages 1994-95 with Selection: Stayer
Variable Coeﬀ.94 (Std.Err.) Coeﬀ.95 (Std.Err.)
Dependent variable: log(wage)
With training 0.149¤¤ (0.008) 0.130¤¤ (0.008)
University or UAS 0.395¤¤ (0.010) 0.400¤¤ (0.010)
Unknown education 0.137¤¤ (0.009) 0.102¤¤ (0.010)
Skilled workers 0.052¤¤ (0.006) 0.058¤¤ (0.006)
Clerks and foremen 0.354¤¤ (0.006) 0.371¤¤ (0.006)
Age 21-25 0.494¤¤ (0.012) 0.512¤¤ (0.013)
Age 26-30 0.597¤¤ (0.012) 0.618¤¤ (0.013)
Age 31-35 0.638¤¤ (0.012) 0.659¤¤ (0.012)
Age 36-40 0.655¤¤ (0.012) 0.685¤¤ (0.012)
Age 41-45 0.660¤¤ (0.012) 0.688¤¤ (0.012)
Age 46-50 0.662¤¤ (0.012) 0.684¤¤ (0.013)
Age 51-64 0.665¤¤ (0.011) 0.679¤¤ (0.012)
Sex 0.226¤¤ (0.004) 0.240¤¤ (0.004)
Brandenburg 0.043¤¤ (0.006) 0.055¤¤ (0.006)
Meck.-W. Pom 0.032¤¤ (0.006) 0.034¤¤ (0.006)
Saxony -0.001 (0.005) 0.008 (0.005)
Saxony-Anhalt 0.017¤¤ (0.006) 0.019¤¤ (0.006)
Agriculture, Cons. Goods -0.055¤¤ (0.005) -0.042¤¤ (0.005)
Goods Production -0.005 (0.005) 0.033¤¤ (0.005)
Construction, transport -0.093¤¤ (0.005) 0.079¤¤ (0.005)
Intercept 3.443¤¤ (0.011) 3.453¤¤ (0.012)
½1²¤ -0.845¤¤ (0.012) -0.877¤¤ (0.010)
¾1 0.301¤¤ (0.001) 0.311¤¤ (0.001)
¸ -0.255¤¤ (0.004) -0.273¤¤ (0.004)
N 33466 34057




Signiﬁcance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Reference category: No training, Unskilled worker, Female, Not married, Thuringia,
Building and construction
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
33Table 4: Heckit East German Wages 1996-97 with Selection: Stayer
Variable Coeﬀ.96 (Std.Err.) Coeﬀ.97 (Std.Err.)
Dependent variable: log(wage)
With training 0.151¤¤ (0.009) 0.143¤¤ (0.009)
University or UAS 0.412¤¤ (0.011) 0.415¤¤ (0.011)
Unknown education 0.104¤¤ (0.010) 0.082¤¤ (0.010)
Skilled workers 0.054¤¤ (0.006) 0.069¤¤ (0.006)
Clerks and foremen 0.378¤¤ (0.006) 0.392¤¤ (0.007)
Age 21-25 0.519¤¤ (0.014) 0.516¤¤ (0.014)
Age 26-30 0.663¤¤ (0.013) 0.671¤¤ (0.013)
Age 31-35 0.707¤¤ (0.013) 0.713¤¤ (0.013)
Age 36-40 0.733¤¤ (0.013) 0.739¤¤ (0.013)
Age 41-45 0.747¤¤ (0.013) 0.768¤¤ (0.013)
Age 46-50 0.722¤¤ (0.013) 0.743¤¤ (0.013)
Age 51-64 0.718¤¤ (0.013) 0.733¤¤ (0.013)
Sex 0.250¤¤ (0.004) 0.250¤¤ (0.004)
Brandenburg 0.048¤¤ (0.006) 0.045¤¤ (0.006)
Meck.-W. Pom. 0.036¤¤ (0.007) 0.030¤¤ (0.007)
Saxony 0.006 (0.005) 0.001 (0.006)
Saxony-Anhalt 0.019¤¤ (0.006) 0.019¤¤ (0.006)
Agriculture, Cons. Goods -0.035¤¤ (0.006) -0.036¤¤ (0.006)
Goods Production 0.050¤¤ (0.006) 0.062¤¤ (0.006)
Construction, transport 0.076¤¤ (0.005) 0.072¤¤ (0.005)
Intercept 3.408¤¤ (0.012) 3.405¤¤ (0.012)
½1²¤ -0.918¤¤ (0.007) -0.919¤¤ (0.008)
¾1 0.319¤¤ (0.001) 0.322¤¤ (0.001)
¸ -0.293¤¤ (0.003) -0.296¤¤ (0.003)
N 32807 31242




Signiﬁcance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Reference category: No training, Unskilled worker, Female, Not married, Thuringia,
Building and Construction
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
34Table 5: Heckit West German Wages 1994-95 with Selection: Mover
Variable Coeﬀ.94 (Std.Err.) Coeﬀ.95 (Std.Err.)
Dependent variable: log(wage)
With training 0.198¤¤ (0.055) 0.098y (0.060)
University or UAS 0.613¤¤ (0.094) 0.334¤¤ (0.113)
Unknown education 0.094 (0.061) 0.055 (0.066)
Skilled workers -0.019 (0.050) 0.074 (0.049)
Clerks and foremen 0.200¤¤ (0.051) 0.354¤¤ (0.053)
Age 21-25 0.196¤ (0.082) 0.196y (0.088)
Age 26-30 0.153y (0.083) 0.158¤ (0.091)
Age 31-35 0.107 (0.085) 0.331¤¤ (0.089)
Age 36-40 0.193¤ (0.091) 0.315¤¤ (0.091)
Age 41-45 0.099 (0.088) 0.220¤ (0.095)
Age 46-50 0.247¤¤ (0.096) 0.335¤¤ (0.103)
Age 51-64 0.240¤ (0.097) 0.183y (0.103)
Sex 0.260¤¤ (0.046) 0.243¤¤ (0.044)
Agriculture, Cons. Goods -0.033 (0.057) 0.049 (0.060)
Goods Production 0.095y (0.052) 0.264¤¤ (0.066)
Construction, transport 0.114¤ (0.048) 0.159¤¤ (0.043)
Intercept 3.548¤¤ (0.171) 3.694¤¤ (0.185)
½1²¤ 0.529¤¤ (0.230) 0.313y (0.182)
¾1 0.387¤¤ (0.058) 0.340¤¤ (0.022)
¸ 0.205¤¤ (0.118) 0.106 (0.068)
N 34198 35020




Signiﬁcance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Reference category: No training, Unskilled worker, Female, Not married, Thuringia,
Building and Construction
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
35Table 6: Heckit West German Wages 1996-97 Selection: Mover
Variable Coeﬀ.96 (Std.Err.) Coeﬀ.97 (Std.Err.)
Dependent variable: log(wage)
With training 0.171¤¤ (0.053) 0.037 (0.068)
University or UAS 0.352¤¤ (0.094) 0.430¤¤ (0.098)
Unknown education 0.083 (0.056) -0.010 (0.072)
Skilled workers 0.076y (0.044) 0.181¤¤ (0.052)
Clerks and foremen 0.337¤¤ (0.043) 0.466¤¤ (0.054)
Age 21-25 0.263¤¤ (0.089) 0.185y (0.101)
Age 26-30 0.291¤¤ (0.089) 0.257¤¤ (0.100)
Age 31-35 0.351¤¤ (0.089) 0.274¤¤ (0.100)
Age 36-40 0.265¤¤ (0.090) 0.254¤ (0.103)
Age 41-45 0.268¤¤ (0.095) 0.224¤ (0.108)
Age 46-50 0.275¤¤ (0.098) 0.266¤ (0.109)
Age 51-64 0.312¤¤ (0.095) 0.299¤¤ (0.111)
Sex 0.285¤¤ (0.040) 0.254¤¤ (0.044)
Agriculture, Cons. Goods 0.047 (0.059) -0.081 (0.067)
Goods Production 0.117¤ (0.053) 0.161¤¤ (0.058)
Construction, transport 0.121¤¤ (0.039) 0.175¤¤ (0.049)
Intercept 3.525¤¤ (0.174) 3.646¤¤ (0.205)
½1²¤ 0.477¤¤ (0.143) 0.359y (0.191)
¾1 0.325¤¤ (0.027) 0.332¤¤ (0.026)
¸ 0.155¤¤ (0.058) 0.119y (0.071)
N 33512 31886




Signiﬁcance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Reference category: No training, Unskilled worker, Female, Not married, Thuringia,
Building and Construction
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
36Table 7: Probit ﬁrst step 1994-1995
Variable Coeﬀ.94 (Std.Err.) Coeﬀ.95 (Std.Err.)
With training -0.002 (0.080) -0.128y (0.084)
University or UAS -0.068 (0.110) -0.156 (0.140)
Unknown education 0.008 (0.095) -0.144 (0.095)
Skilled workers -0.159¤ (0.063) -0.152¤ (0.068)
Clerks and foremen -0.104 (0.067) -0.085 (0.072)
Unemployed 0.640¤¤ (0.078) 0.587¤¤ (0.064)
Age 21-25 0.216¤ (0.108) 0.355¤¤ (0.016)
Age 26-30 0.013 (0.114) 0.046 (0.016)
Age 31-35 -0.141 (0.115) -0.014 (0.016)
Age 36-40 -0.239¤ (0.119) -0.071 (0.016)
Age 41-45 -0.175 (0.118) -0.097 (0.016)
Age 46-50 -0.211y (0.126) -0.188 (0.016)
Age 51-64 -0.408¤¤ (0.121) -0.377¤¤ (0.016)
Sex 0.207¤¤ (0.048) 0.191¤¤ (0.055)
Marital status -0.129¤¤ (0.045) -0.057 (0.051)
Children 0.020 (0.094) 0.076 (0.051)
Agric., Cons.Goods -0.120y (0.063) -0.048 (0.122)
Goods Production -0.008 (0.058) 0.022 (0.078)
Construct., Trans. -0.064 (0.055) 0.016 (0.094)
Brandenburg 0.112y (0.065) -0.024 (0.071)
Meck.-W. Pom. 0.101 (0.071) 0.005 (0.077)
Saxony -0.080 (0.062) -0.193¤¤ (0.065)
Saxony-Anhalt 0.057 (0.065) -0.093 (0.071)





Signiﬁcance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Reference category: No training, Unskilled worker, Female, Not married, Thuringia,
Building and Construction
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
37Table 8: Probit ﬁrst step 1996-1997
Variable Coeﬀ.96 (Std.Err.) Coeﬀ.97 (Std.Err.)
With training 0.005 (0.086) -0.032 (0.088)
University or UAS -0.007 (0.119) 0.078 (0.117)
Unknown education 0.176y (0.098) 0.113 (0.100)
Skilled workers -0.134¤ (0.063) -0.097 (0.068)
Clerks and foremen -0.127y (0.068) -0.073 (0.072)
Unemployed 0.476¤¤ (0.074) 0.455¤¤ (0.070)
Age 21-25 0.359¤¤ (0.128) 0.395¤¤ (0.127)
Age 26-30 0.246y (0.135) 0.207 (0.137)
Age 31-35 0.169 (0.135) -0.002 (0.139)
Age 36-40 0.082 (0.138) -0.052 (0.141)
Age 41-45 -0.084 (0.143) -0.168 (0.144)
Age 46-50 -0.023 (0.146) -0.128 (0.146)
Age 51-64 -0.157 (0.141) -0.298¤ (0.145)
Sex 0.193¤¤ (0.050) 0.137¤¤ (0.050)
Marital status -0.179¤¤ (0.047) -0.091y (0.050)
Children 0.125 (0.089) 0.081 (0.088)
Agric., Cons. Goods -0.141¤ (0.070) -0.199¤¤ (0.074)
Goods Production -0.183¤¤ (0.071) -0.069 (0.066)
Constr., Transp. 0.056 (0.054) -0.082 (0.058)
Brandenburg -0.195¤¤ (0.065) -0.033 (0.066)
Meck.-W. Pom. -0.195¤¤ (0.073) -0.033 (0.072)
Saxony -0.261¤¤ (0.057) -0.205¤¤ (0.061)
Saxony-Anhalt -0.130¤ (0.062) -0.139¤ (0.068)





Signiﬁcance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Reference category: No training, Unskilled worker, Female, Not married,
Thuringia, Building and Construction
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
38Table 9: Probability to move 1994-1995, structural results
Variable Coeﬀ.94 (Std.Err.) Coeﬀ.95 (Std.Err.)
Unemployed 0.658¤¤ (0.074) 0.589¤¤ (0.068)
Wage diﬀerential 0.553¤¤ (0.186) 0.327¤ (0.151)
Marital status -0.248¤¤ (0.044) -0.242¤¤ (0.043)
Children 0.004 (0.044) 0.068 (0.083)
Brandenburg 0.141¤ (0.072) -0.034 (0.066)
Meck.-W. Pom. 0.119y (0.078) 0.024 (0.070)
Saxony -0.081 (0.067) -0.210¤¤ (0.060)
Saxony-Anhalt 0.060 (0.072) -0.094 (0.065)





Signiﬁcance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Reference category: Employed, Not married, no children, Thuringia
All variables except the wage diﬀerential refer to the year before
Table 10: Probability to move 1996-1997, structural results
Variable Coeﬀ.96 (Std.Err.) Coeﬀ.97 (Std.Err.)
Unemployed 0.471¤¤ (0.072) 0.482¤¤ (0.067)
Wage diﬀerential 0.406¤ (0.163) 0.144 (0.162)
Marital status -0.299¤¤ (0.043) -0.281¤¤ (0.044)
Children 0.140 (0.086) 0.068 (0.085)
Brandenburg -0.154¤ (0.065) -0.017 (0.066)
Meck.-W. Pom. -0.157¤ (0.071) -0.008 (0.071)
Saxony -0.259¤¤ (0.057) -0.210¤¤ (0.061)
Saxony-Anhalt -0.133¤ (0.061) -0.126y (0.067)





Signiﬁcance levels : y : 10% ¤ : 5% ¤¤ : 1%
Reference category: Employed, Not married, no children, Thuringia
All variables except the wage diﬀerential refer to the year before
39Table 11: Summary 94-97
Variable Mean94 Mean95 Mean96 Mean97
log(wage) 4.565 4.608 4.627 4.637
(0.397) (0.408) (0.425) (0.434)
Age 17-20 0.029 0.028 0.030 0.031
Age 21-25 0.079 0.080 0.075 0.071
Age 26-30 0.123 0.113 0.105 0.102
Age 31-35 0.158 0.156 0.154 0.148
Age 36-40 0.157 0.155 0.154 0.156
Age 41-45 0.154 0.159 0.157 0.155
Age 46-50 0.101 0.099 0.113 0.129
Age 51-64 0.198 0.211 0.211 0.207
Male 0.580 0.576 0.565 0.563
Mover Dummy 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.011
Unemployed 0.042 0.067 0.061 0.080
Marital status 0.558 0.565 0.571 0.574
Children 0.047 0.059 0.053 0.059
Without training 0.080 0.083 0.082 0.086
With training 0.743 0.733 0.733 0.729
UAS or University degree 0.110 0.107 0.106 0.104
Unknown education 0.076 0.077 0.079 0.081
Trainees and unskilled 0.152 0.163 0.164 0.168
Skilled workers 0.382 0.375 0.369 0.365
Clerks and foremen 0.465 0.462 0.467 0.467
Brandenburg 0.181 0.179 0.177 0.176
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 0.123 0.123 0.124 0.125
Saxony 0.337 0.338 0.339 0.344
Saxony-Anhalt 0.195 0.194 0.193 0.193
Thuringia 0.164 0.166 0.167 0.163
Agriculture, Consumption Goods 0.155 0.145 0.138 0.137
Goods Production 0.161 0.149 0.146 0.146
Construction, Transport 0.210 0.225 0.226 0.225
Trade, Services 0.473 0.481 0.489 0.492
Number of observations 34207 35034 33516 31889
No. of obs. lnwage 33457 34043 32803 31238
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
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